The dialogical ontologies of Eugen Rosenstock‑Huessy and Martin Buber: a comparative analysis
Abstract
The article conducts a comparative analysis of two dialogical ontologies — that of Martin Buber and Eugen Rosenstock‑Huessy — followed by an examination of the criticism that Rosenstock‑Huessy directs at Buber’s doctrine. It is shown that Buber, despite his own criticism of Cartesianism, retains the subject‑object framework, contrasting the I‑You relationship (encounter, dialogue) with the I‑It relationship (experience, monologue) and ontologizing the event of encounter. In contrast to this, Rosenstock‑Huessy develops a grammatical‑historical model in which the primary element is a call addressed to a person, and the I emerges only as a response to this call.
The main lines of criticism of Rosenstock‑Huessy are: the denial of the ontological co‑existence of the I–You and I–It relationships, a different view of the genesis of language (not babbling, but a response to a call), the introduction of the categories “We” and “You,” which are absent in Buber, as well as the accusation of gnosticism for asserting the direct encounter between a person and God without the mediation of tradition and community. It is concluded that the divergence between the thinkers is systemic in nature and stems from different answers to the question of what comes first — a person’s обращение to the world or the world’s call to the person.